It’s Pilot vs. System, and I Hope Pilot

I try to make things simple for my mom (not because of anything other than her desire to cut through the crap) after any aircraft crashes—especially if they are of the kind of aircraft or type of flying that I do. As most of you would know, this simplified rationale was again needed due to some recent crashes out west.

My effort was, “As dark as it sounds, if you want to know my thoughts, I hope we learn that ‘pilot error’ was the cause. That’s far easier to live with than the idea that one day the helicopter is just going to kill me.” The reader can see in this dichotomy the split that every pilot learns from the start of pilot training. Crashes are either pilot error or mechanical. And 80% of crashes are pilot error according to the data. It also makes sense. And it also keeps aviation functioning. Why would anyone want to hop into or fly an aircraft that cannot perform its function reliably?

After chatting with a couple mechanics recently, I was reminded that they bear the heavy cross of “I sure hope it wasn’t mechanical”. This coheres with other offhand comments aircraft mechanics have uttered over my career, being, “That’s what I lose sleep over.” These mechanics do not want to find that some unfinished or inept work of theirs got people killed.

There is a sense which the pilot and mechanic can be said to be “of a kind” on crashes then. They (we) both want flawless aircraft and flawed (if only very infrequently) pilots. But this is not what I meant when I simplified things to my mom.

The reason for the post, the complex version of my thoughts on the matter, is as follows. It isn’t simply man vs. machine. Or even man and machine. It is man and system. Or man vs. system. I mean to draw out that if the aircraft had a mechanical problem which the pilot was unable to handle, the “problem” that now needs to be addressed is enormous and multi-tiered. It’s a question of quality of engineers, quality of materials, quality of parts, quality of QC, quality of maintenance program, quality of individual mechanic who performed the work, and quality of pilot who preflighted (which also includes his or her training and all of the people and processes involved there). Depending on the mechanical failure, there is also a possible new data set regarding deficient training for the pilot regarding Emergency Procedures. A, “I didn’t know what to do because we never saw that fail before.” So all that is what I mean by “system” in my “pilot vs. system” framing. This is to say, no, it’s not just “mechanical”. It’s actually a ding against the whole aviation system.

On the other hand, if the pilot caused the crash, then there is just one pilot who didn’t perform his simple task of perform the same number of landings as takeoffs. And that can happen to any pilot for a variety of reasons—though, being the best pilot ever (best of the best to be more clear), it naturally won’t happen to me.

In the end, the result is the same. I believe in the aviation system. And I believe that I should be the pilot which demonstrates how the system is truly remarkable. This is why, when considering pilot’s who crash have families and are possibly injuring passengers who have families etc, I can admit that it would *feel* good to attribute the crash to, essentially, “fate” or anyone else’s fault, the simple fact is and will always be that part of the motivation to be a pilot is the consequential nature of the job. If I didn’t believe in the system and my ability to lead it, I wouldn’t strap the aircraft on time and time again.

PS – Even the Huntington Beach one which YouTube seems to show was a pure part failure (‘system’ according to my point) can’t yet be chalked up to “system”. We do not yet know if the system failed or the pilot didn’t perform an adequate preflight and forms review etc.

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